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1 Introduction
European Council Directive 85/611/EEC sets the general legal framework within
which undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities may carry
on their business. The directive establishes that “the law or the fund rules must
prescribe the remuneration and the expenditure which a management company
is empowered to charge to a unit trust and the method of calculation of such
remuneration.” Therefore, legal restrictions to the way companies managing
mutual funds can be compensated for their services, if any, are to be found only
at the national level. In Spain the law (Ley 46/1984) foresees three forms of
retribution to management companies: fees can be set (within certain limits) as
a function of assets under management, pro…ts, or both. Companies managing
mutual funds are therefore left with a large degree of latitude when it comes to
deciding on the mechanism and the value of their compensation. Investors, in
turn, may choose from a wide range of mutual funds and mutual fund families,
so it is not obvious a priori what compensation mechanism should be expected
to take place in practice.
The analysis presented in this paper builds on the work by Ross (1973, 1974)
and Leland (1978), who showed that –under certain assumptions– it is optimal
for the agent to o¤er the principal an e¢cient incentive system as long as the
optimal risk sharing rule is linear. In other words, the linear compensation
scheme induces the agent to act in the principal’s best interest. In a delegated
portfolio management framework, Bhattacharya and P‡eiderer (1985) studied
departures from the e¢cient solution when managers have heterogeneous fore-
casting abilities which are unknown to the investor, and Grinblatt and Titman
(1989) identi…ed an option e¤ect of compensation schemes that only provide
compensation for positive returns relative to a benchmark. More recently, Ad-
mati and P‡eiderer (1997) have shown that using benchmark portfolios to de-
termine the manager’s compensation may lead to suboptimal portfolio decisions
even if negative compensations are allowed. Recently, García (2000) has stud-
ied the contracting problem when the principal and the agent have di¤erent risk
endowments and/or di¤erent beliefs about the risk-return trade-o¤ of the assets
under management.
De…ning the management fee as a fraction of assets under management at
the beginning of the period, this paper compares the implications of two simple
types of performance-based fees: a constant times the portfolio’s gross return
and a constant times the portfolio’s net return. The …rst type of retribution
can be thought of as an end-of-period assets-based compensation, whereas the
second type is rather a pro…ts-based payment. It is shown that the former is
generally an e¢cient albeit expensive way of inducing the manager to take any
given action. On the other hand, the latter induces the manager to select unde-
sirably high levels of risk from the investors’ viewpoint. This is a consequence
of the option e¤ect studied by Grinblatt and Titman (1989) which results from
managers’ limited liability. Contrary to their …nding however, in the absence
of a benchmark return a risk averse agent does not necessarily wish to take an
unbounded position in the risky asset, the reason being that for some low re-
1
alizations of the risky asset’s payo¤, the manager receives a fee that is positive
although monotically decreasing in the level of risk undertaken.
The legal provision for the case of Spain1 enables us to study which type of
retribution (assets versus pro…ts -based) is chosen more frequently in practice.
Casual observation of mutual fund compensation contracts reveals that manage-
ment companies are almost invariably compensated with an assets-based rather
than a pro…ts-based fee. Next, taking this form of compensation as given, the
paper studies how the value of expense ratios should be determined if the prin-
cipal’s trade-o¤ between providing the agent with better incentives in terms of
risk-taking and incurring a lower cost of compensating the manager is to be
optimally solved. The analysis is carried out both for the case of an agent who
has the same information as the principal, and for the case of an agent who
owns some valuable piece of information. A striking …nding is that the optimal
expense ratio under the assets-based retribution is not monotonically increasing
in the manager’s ability to forecast future returns.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 explores the agent’s portfo-
lio choice problem when fees are based on performance; section 3 studies the
optimal determination of the compensation function parameter given that it is
chosen to be a linear function of assets under management; section 4 extends the
analysis of section 3 to the case when the portfolio manager is better informed
than the market; and …nally section 5 concludes.
2 Performance-based fee contracts
Consider the following simple performance-based fee:
F = k (Rp ¡ Q) (1)
where F is the fraction of the portfolio’s value at the beginning of the period
that the management company charges to investors, Rp is de…ned as the gross
return of the managed fund in the evaluation period and k and Q are constants.
Throughout the paper, k will also be referred to as expense ratio accordingly
with the industry’s usual terminology. Assuming that no further contributions
are made to the managed portfolio, if Q = 0, then the management company’s
(henceforth “the manager” or “the agent”) compensation equals kW , where W
denotes the total value of assets under management at the end of the period. On
the other hand, if Q = 1; then the fund manager’s retribution equals k(W ¡W0),
where W0 denotes the total value of assets under management at the beginning
of the period. Note that (W ¡ W0) can be positive or negative, so this type of
contract admits the possibility of penalizing the manager for underperformance.
Next, assume that:
1 In Spain, companies were managing over 200,000 million euros in publicly available, open-
end mutual fund assets as of the end of March 31, 2000 according to the Investment Company
Institute. This makes Spain the country with the sixth largest mutual fund industry in Europe.
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Assumption 1 there are two assets in the economy: a riskless asset with unit
price that pays R per share at the end of the period, with R > 1, and a
risky asset with price P that pays r per share,
Assumption 2 the risky asset’s price at the end of the period is given by:
r = s + ²; (2)
where s belongs to the information set of all individuals, s > RP , and ²
is distributed as N (0; ¾2² );
Assumption 3 an investor –or a group of investor’s– (henceforth “the in-
vestor” or “the principal”) is endowed with initial wealth W0; and del-
egates all investment decisions a¤ecting her portfolio on the manager,
Assumption 4 the investor/principal and the agent/manager have preferences
that can be represented by the exponential utility function: V (Z) =
¡ exp(¡aZ); where a > 0 is the constant absolute risk aversion coe¢-
cient, and Z is the individual’s wealth at the end of the period,
Assumption 5 neither the manager nor the investor can trade on their own
portfolios, and
Assumption 6 trading takes place once at the beginning of the period. At the
end of the period the fund is liquidated and the manager is compensated
with FW0:
The …nal value of the fund if the agent buys M of the riskless asset and X
of the risky asset equals:
W = RM + rX = RW0 + (r ¡ RP )X; (3)
which incorporates the budget constraint W0 = M + PX . W is thus normally
distributed with mean equal to RW0 + (s ¡RP )X and variance equal to ¾2²X2:
An investor acting on her account would choose X so as to maximize her
expected utility:
EVi = ¡ exp

¡ai
µ
RW0 + (s ¡ RP )X ¡
ai¾
2
²X
2
2
¶¸
: (4)
The optimal portfolio choice then equals:
X =
s ¡ RP
ai¾2²
; (5)
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so her expected utility is given by:
EVi = ¡ exp

¡ai
µ
RW0 +
(s ¡ RP )2
2ai¾2²
¶¸
: (6)
Consider next the case when F = kRp; so the manager is compensated
with kW . Once the portfolio management contract has been signed, the agent
chooses the amount X that maximizes his expected utility:
EVA = ¡ exp
½
¡aA

k(RW0 + (s ¡ RP )X) ¡
aAk
2¾2²X
2
2
¸¾
; (7)
where aA denotes the agent’s risk aversion coe¢cient.
From the …rst order condition, the agent’s decision is:
XA =
s ¡ RP
aAk¾2²
: (8)
On the other hand, the utility that the principal expects to obtain from her
participation in the contract equals:
EVP = ¡ exp
½
¡aP

(1 ¡ k)(RW0 + (s ¡ RP )X) ¡
aP (1 ¡ k)2¾2²X2
2
¸¾
; (9)
where aP denotes the principal’s risk aversion coe¢cient.
Given her expected utility, the principal would like the agent to purchase an
amount of the risky asset such that the previous expression is maximized:
XP =
s ¡ RP
aP (1 ¡ k)¾2²
: (10)
Clearly, k can be chosen in a way that the agent’s choice is optimal from the
principal’s perspective. This is achieved by setting:
k = k¤ ´ aP
aP + aA
: (11)
This value of k is the familiar …rst-best e¢cient compensation coe¢cient when
the principal and the agent have exponential utility functions. Substituting the
agent’s choice of X for k¤ into (9) gives the following value for the investor’s
expected utility:
EVP = ¡ exp
½
¡aP

¡k¤RW0 + RW0 +
(s ¡ RP )2
2aP ¾2²
¸¾
: (12)
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If F = k(W=W0 ¡ 1); then the manager’s compensation equals k(W ¡ W0):
Setting this kind of compensation rather than kW does not alter the value of k
that achieves e¢cient risk sharing, which is still given by (11). The investor’s
expected utility in this case equals:
EVP = ¡ exp
½
¡aP

¡k¤(R ¡ 1)W0 + RW0 +
(s ¡ RP )2
2aP¾2²
¸¾
: (13)
The pro…ts-based fee is however a much cheaper way of compensating the
manager: it increases the principal’s certainty equivalent by k¤W0: Think of a
mutual fund with one hundred million euros in assets. If 2% is the value of k
that ensures that the manager will take the level of risk that the investor desires,
an assets-based compensation contract decreases the investor’s wealth by two
million euros. More generally, the value of Q does not a¤ect the variable part of
the agent’s compensation, kW , and hence the agent’s risk choice for a given k.
It does however decrease the …xed compensation to the manager by kQW0: So
if the principal could choose, she would select k¤ and a negative value of Q only
bounded by the agent’s participation constraint. A pro…ts-based compensation
mechanism hence dominates an assets-based one.
Unfortunately for investors, management companies are not liable for any
loss that the fund may su¤er. This implies that the kind of contracts that are
observed in reality take the nonlinear form:
F = max[0; k (Rp ¡ Q)]: (14)
How di¤erent are in practice the contracts considered above from their lim-
ited liability counterparts? The answer depends on the likelihood of k (Rp ¡ Q)
being negative. If Q = 0; the manager’s compensation equals max[0; kW ] which
provided that k is positive equals kW whenever W is nonnegative. If borrowing
by funds is not allowed2 , the probability of W being negative is bounded by
the probability of the risky asset’s payo¤ being negative, which is precluded by
asset-holders’ limited liability. Given the normal distribution assumption how-
ever, this event is possible in our model economy. Nevertheless, if we think of
the risky asset as a stock index, usual moment values would make that event
very unlikely. For instance, if r ¡ 1 is normally distributed with mean 15% and
standard deviation 35%, then the likelihood of r being negative is just 0.05%.
On the other hand, the probability of r ¡ 1 being lower than zero –namely the
probability of the riskiest possible portfolio’s pro…ts being negative– is as high
as 1=3. This example illustrates how under the normal distribution assumption
the linear contract with Q = 0 can be a good approximation of (14), whereas
the same cannot be said about the linear contract when Q = 1:
In what follows, the term “assets-based contract” will indicate that the port-
folio manager is compensated with kW; whereas a “pro…ts-based” compensation
will denote:
2 Directive 85/611/EEC, article 36 only allows borrowing “up to 10% of the value of the
fund provided that the borrowing is only on a temporary basis”.
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FW0 = k max[0; (W ¡ W0)]: (15)
The question is whether this sort of compensation scheme induces the manager
to take too much risk. It can be shown that:
Proposition 1 for any given value of k under the compensation scheme (15):
(i) the agent’s unconstrained choice of X exceeds his optimal response under the
contract without limited liability, but (ii) the agent’s unconstrained choice of X
is not necessarily unbounded.
Proof. See appendix (A1).
The …rst part of the proposition is very intuitive. Figure 1 shows the man-
ager’s fee as a function of the risky asset’s payo¤ r and for di¤erent values of X .
Since the agent’s payo¤ is bounded from below, increasing the riskiness of the
managed portfolio has a positive asymmetric e¤ect on the agent’s …nal wealth.
However, for those states in which:
(R ¡ 1)W0 > (R ¡ 1)W0 + (r ¡ RP )X > 0
namely, whenever the fund’s pro…t is positive but less than the riskless pro…t
(which is the case as long as r < RP ), the manager’s payo¤ is monotonically
decreasing in X . This possibility deters a risk averse manager from taking an
unbounded position in the risky asset.
Consider what happens if the manager is compensated with a constant frac-
tion of the portfolio’s pro…t in excess of the riskless pro…t. In that case, the
manager’s payo¤ could be calculated by replacing (3) into k max[0; (W ¡ W0)¡
(RW0 ¡ W0)]:
FW0 = k max[0; (r ¡ RP )X ] = kX max[0; (r ¡ RP )]; (16)
so as long as k > 0 any utility maximizing manager would take an unbounded
position in the risky asset. The reason is quite simple: if the riskless pro…t
is taken as a benchmark, then an increase in X does not a¤ect the manager’s
payo¤ when r < RP (which is zero anyway), and does however increase the
manager’s payo¤ for those states in which r > RP:
In the absence of a benchmark, the appendix shows that the agent’s optimal
position in the risky asset is bounded if the agent’s utility from choosing X = 0
plus the probability of r being lower than RP is nonnegative. In other words,
the following is a su¢cient condition for a bounded solution to the manager’s
problem to exist:
¡ exp(¡aAkW0(R ¡ 1)) + ©
µ
¡ s ¡ RP
¾
¶
¸ 0 (17)
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Where ©(¢) denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution. Intuitively,
the manager refrains more from taking very risky positions the larger his ex-
pected utility from not taking any risks and the higher the probability of (r¡RP )
being negative. Again, if the riskless pro…t is taken as the benchmark pro…t,
then condition (17) becomes:
¡1 + ©
µ
¡s ¡ RP
¾
¶
¸ 0 (18)
which never holds true.
It is therefore clear that pro…t-based fees do not necessarily result in the
manager taking extraordinary amounts of risk, and are a cheaper way of com-
pensating managers. How popular are they in the industry? Consider the
case of Spain where the law explicitly distinguishes between assets-based and
pro…t-based fees. During 1999, 290 new mutual funds registered at the Spanish
Security Exchange Commission. Fund prospectuses were consulted on the in-
ternet for 239 of those newly registered mutual funds. The search showed that
228 funds were charging a fee that was proportional to the value of assets under
management, and 11 also charged a fee proportional to the fund’s positive net
income. None of the prospectuses consulted established a fee proportional to
the fund’s income exclusively. This result could be interpreted as investors be-
ing reluctant to invest in funds whose managers are compensated only in those
periods where the fund makes a net positive pro…t, perhaps deterred by fears
of managers taking too much risk. On the other hand, it could simply mean
that management companies expect more pro…t from assets-based fee contracts
even though the legal upper limit is lower than in the case of a pro…t-based
fee. Whatever the explanation, assets-based fee contracts clearly dominate in
practice.
The next two sections take the assets-based form of compensation as ex-
ogenous and solve for the value of k that maximizes investors’ welfare, i.e.,
the optimal solution to the investor’s trade-o¤ between incurring a lower cost
of incentive provision and providing the manager with better incentives. The
resulting expense ratio will be termed “optimal” in that particular sense, not
because it corresponds to an optimal contract. To see that an assets-based con-
tract is not optimal for the principal, simply note that it would be dominated
by a pro…t-based contract with no manager’s limited liability.
3 Optimal expense ratio without private infor-
mation
This section studies the portfolio management problem when both the principal
and the agent know the value of s. If the agent does not manage the principal’s
portfolio, he may trade on his own account. His optimal choice of X and his
corresponding reservation expected utility are given by:
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X =
s ¡ RP
aA¾2²
; (19)
¹u = ¡ exp

¡aA
µ
(s ¡ RP )2
2aA¾2²
¶¸
(20)
On the other hand, substituting (8) in (7) and (9), it is possible to calculate
the value of the agent and principal’s expected utility in anticipation of the
agent’s decision:
EVA = ¡ exp
½
¡aA

kRW0 +
(s ¡ RP )2
2aA¾2²
¸¾
; (21)
EVP = ¡ exp
½
¡aP

(1 ¡ k)RW0 + C(k)
(s ¡ RP )2
aP ¾2²
¸¾
: (22)
with:
C(k) ´ (1 ¡ k)aP
kaA
¡ 1
2

(1 ¡ k)aP
kaA
¸2
: (23)
Function C (k) always takes on a value less than or equal to 1=2. When
k = k¤; the agent’s decision is optimal for the principal too, and C(k) reaches
its maximum value. Values underneath 1=2 therefore re‡ect the negative impact
of a suboptimal incentive system on the principal’s expected utility. The form
of the function shows two possible sources for an agency problem in this model:
di¤erent attitudes towards risk and di¤erent shares in the …nal portfolio. When
k is set at its e¢cient value k¤, both e¤ects cancel out.
The properties of C(k) are analyzed in the appendix and …gure 2 shows its
plot.
In any case, (21) proves that for any linear compensation function the agent
adjusts his response so that he always obtains his reservation certainty equiva-
lent plus kRW0. Therefore, the manager’s participation constraint implies:
kRW0 +
(s ¡ RP )2
2aA¾2²
¸ (s ¡ RP )
2
2aA¾2²
=) k ¸ 0 (24)
Taking the assets-based fee contract as exogenous, the principal’s problem
is that of choosing k such that her expected utility is maximized. An expense
ratio equal to k¤ guarantees e¢cient risk sharing, but is more costly than a lower
value of k: If the expense ratio were chosen so that it maximizes the investor’s
welfare, it would be the solution to the following problem:
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max
h
(1 ¡ k)RW0 + C (k) (s¡RP )
2
aP¾2²
i
k
subject to k ¸ 0
(25)
Proposition 2 When the investor can choose the terms of the linear retribution
function under (1) with Q = 0, the solution to the principal’s problem is given
by k such that:
C 0(k)
(s ¡ RP )2
aP ¾2²
= RW0 (26)
Proof. See appendix (A3).
Since RW > 0; it follows that at the optimum C 0(k) > 0; so k < k¤ from
the concavity of C. The most immediate consequence is that the agent will not
act in the investor’s best interest. In particular, for positive values of (s ¡RP );
he will purchase a larger than optimal amount of the risky asset.
The values of the agent and the principal’s expected utility under this type
of compensation should therefore be:
EVA = ¡ exp
½
¡aA

kRW0 +
(s ¡ RP )2
2aA¾2²
¸¾
; (27)
EVP = ¡ exp
½
¡aP

(1 ¡ k)RW0 + C(k)
(s ¡ RP )2
aP ¾2²
¸¾
: (28)
where k solves (26). Note that the solution is not e¢cient since C(k) < 1=2.
The resulting value of k depends on the model parameters as well as on the
agent and principal’s preferences. C(k) is concave at the optimum since C0(k)
is positive at the solution and the region where C(k) is increasing is contained
within the concave region. As a consequence, the optimal k is increasing in the
risk premium and decreasing in the initial portfolio size, W0; as well as in the
volatility of the risky asset’s return.
4 The case of private information
Suppose that only a few individuals know the actual value of s. The rest only
know that s is distributed as N (Es; ¾2s), which is independent of the conditional
distribution of r. For those individuals who do not observe s, the unconditional
distribution of r from (2) is normal with mean Es and variance ¾2r with:
¾ 2r = ¾
2
s + ¾
2
² (29)
The realized value of s can be interpreted as a privately observed signal,
1=¾2² being the signal’s precision. In the extreme case that ¾
2
² = 0, the informed
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individual knows the value of r exactly. It will be assumed that ¾2² is a strictly
positive value.
The model is completed with the assumption that individuals’ actions do
not a¤ect asset prices and prices do not contain information about s. This
assumption isolates the market for information from the market for the risky
asset, which given the risk aversion assumption, is su¢cient to guarantee that
the risky asset has a positive risk premium (see Allen (1990)):
³ ´ Es ¡ RP > 0: (30)
An uninformed investor’s problem amounts to maximizing her expected util-
ity which follows from the unconditional distribution of r:
EVi = ¡ exp

¡ai
µ
RW0;i + ³X ¡
ai¾
2
rX
2
2
¶¸
; (31)
the uninformed investor’s optimal demand is thus:
X =
³
ai¾2r
; (32)
so her expected utility equals:
EVi = ¡ exp

¡ai
µ
RW0;i +
³2
2ai¾2r
¶¸
: (33)
On the other, the expected utility of an informed investor who observes s is
given by (6). As shown by Allen (1990), taking expectations over s it is possible
to obtain the informed investor’s expected utility prior to observing s :
EVi = ¡ exp

¡ai
µ
RW0;i +
³2
2ai¾ 2r
+ ´
¶¸
; (34)
with
´ ´ 1
2ai
log
¾ 2r
¾ 2²
: (35)
The second term in the argument of (34) corresponds to the second term in
(6) and (33). It is the value of taking an optimal position in the risk-reward
trade-o¤ given the conditioning information. The third term is the signal’s
ex ante value, i.e. the value of private information. Of course, ´ is higher
the higher the signal’s precision. The existence of informed agents justi…es
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delegated portfolio management when direct sale of information is not possible
or too costly. This section shows that agency contracts allow the investor to
extract at least part of the value of the manager’s private information.
Finally, if the informed agent has no initial endowment, his reservation ex-
pected utility equals:
EVA = ¡ exp

¡aA
µ
³2
2aA¾2r
+ ´
¶¸
: (36)
It will be assumed that the delegated portfolio management contract is
signed before the agent obtains his private information.
Taking the assets-based fee as given, the investor and the manager’s expected
utility as well as their optimal portfolios for a given value s coincide with those
of the model without private information. Substituting the agent’s optimal
demand (8) in both expected utility functions conditional on s gives again (21)
and (22). Next, taking expectations over s, the ex ante expected utility of the
agent and the principal are obtained as:
EVA = ¡ exp
½
¡aA

kRW0 +
³2
2aA¾2r
+ ´
¸¾
and (37)
EVP = ¡ exp f¡aP [(1 ¡ k)RW0 + ª + -]g : (38)
where:
ª ´ C
aP
³2
(¾2² + 2C¾
2
s)
(39)
- ´ 1
2aP
log
µ
¾2² + 2C¾
2
s
¾2²
¶
: (40)
where C is the function de…ned by (23).
The Appendix (A4) describes the properties of ª and -:
When C is lower than 1=2; i.e. when k 6= k¤; the …rst term ª is lower than
the value of the principal’s optimal position in her risk-reward trade-o¤:
C (k)
aP
³2
(¾2² + 2C(k)¾
2
s)
<
³2
2aP ¾2r
8k 6= k¤ (41)
The above inequality is an agency cost similar to that borne by the investor
in the model with no private information. It can be eliminated by setting k
such that the agent takes the position in the risky asset that is optimal for the
principal.
Similarly, function - reaches its maximum value, ´, when C equals 1=2. In
that case, the principal extracts the full value of the manager’s private informa-
tion. This second agency cost is therefore a consequence of the manager’s private
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information not being fully exploited in the investor’s best interest. Again, the
…rst-best expense ratio, k¤ eliminates this agency cost.
As for the manager, for any value of k, he responds so that he takes his
optimal position in the risk-reward trade-o¤ and at the same time he obtains
the full value of his private information as seen from (37). As in the case of no
private information, his participation constraint is met as long as:
k ¸ 0: (42)
The principal’s problem stated in terms of certainty equivalents and incor-
porating the agent’s portfolio decision can then be formulated as follows:
max [(1 ¡ k)RW0 + ª(k) + -(k)]
k
subject to k ¸ 0
: (43)
Proposition 3 In the private information model the solution to the principal’s
problem under (1) with Q = 0 is given by k such that:
@(ª + -)
@k
= RW0: (44)
Proof. See appendix (A5).
From the properties of ª and - ; and given that RW0 is strictly positive,
the value of k that solves (43) is in the interval (0; aP
aP +aA
); and therefore in
the region in which (ª + -) is concave in k. The solution can be interpreted
as in the case of symmetric information: when the investor must bear the cost
of incentive provision, the expense ratio should solve the investor’s trade o¤
between a higher cost of incentive provision and a lower agency cost.
Note that the investor is able to capture part of the value of the manager’s
private information, so it is possible for her to improve her expected utility
through a delegated portfolio management contract provided that the increase
in her expected utility o¤sets the loss due to the agency cost.
Note also that the expense ratio that solves the principal’s problem under the
contract constraints depends on model parameters other than the risk aversion
coe¢cients. Given that at the optimum (ª+- ) is a concave function, it follows
that the expense ratio decreases with the value of the investor’s initial wealth.
The reason, as in the model with no private information, is that a higher value
of W0 increases the marginal cost of increasing k.
A deeper comparative statics analysis is required in order to study the re-
lationship between the optimal expense ratio and the quality of the manager’s
information given the highly nonlinear functional form of ª and - . First, de…ne
± ´ ¾
2
²
¾2r
;
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so ¾2² can be replaced with ±¾
2
r and ¾
2
s with (1 ¡ ±)¾2r . An increase in ± can be
interpreted as a decrease in the precision of the manager’s private information.
Next, de…ne
F (±; k) ´ @(ª + -)
@k
The principal chooses k such that F (±; k) = RW0. From the implicit function
theorem and given that at the optimal choice (ª+- ) is concave in k, it follows
that k is increasing in ± (decreasing in precision) as long as:
@F (±; k)
@±
> 0
The appendix (A6) shows that the slope of - with respect to k is decreasing
in ± . On the other hand, for values of k above a cut-o¤ value, the slope of
ª is increasing in ±; whereas for values of k below the threshold, the slope
is decreasing. If only - is considered, it is optimal for the investor to pay a
higher k the higher the quality of the manager’s information since an increase
in the precision of the manager’s signal increases the marginal bene…t of raising
k above its marginal cost and - is concave. This is however not true for ª when
the value of k is high enough. In that case the investor is better o¤ improving
the incentives of a worse quality manager.
As a result of the interaction of both e¤ects, the appendix shows that:
@F (±; k)
@±
> 0 () C > 1
2
±(³2 + ¾2r)
(³2 ¡ ¾2r) + ±(³2 + ¾2r)
: (45)
Since C is increasing in k, there exists a value k^ so high that condition (45)
is met so k is decreasing in the quality of the manager’s information. That
particular value is such that:
C =
1
2
±(³2 + ¾2r)
(³2 ¡ ¾2r) + ±(³2 + ¾2r)
(46)
Note that if ¾2r > ³
2; then the above condition requires that C > 1
2
; which is
impossible. In that case, condition (45) is never met and k is always increasing
in the precision of the manager’s signal.
Assuming that ¾2r < ³
2; the precision of private information and the optimal
value of k are related as follows. Starting o¤ with a level of precision such
that the optimal value of k is below k^; if precision increases; i.e., if ± decreases
then ® increases as predicted by (45). Therefore, the new optimal value k must
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be higher since (ª + - ) is concave. On the other hand, as ± decreases, the
threshold value k^ also decreases. There must be a value of ± such that the
optimal k is exactly k^. At that point, a small increase in precision does not
a¤ect the optimal value of k; but the threshold value k^ that corresponds to
the new level of precision decreases so condition (45) holds true. It can be
concluded that the form of the relationship between the optimal expense ratio
and the quality of management in this model is concave with both an increasing
and a decreasing region.
This result is a consequence exclusively of the agency cost associated with
ª; which arises when the manager’s investment decision departs from the in-
vestor’s optimum. An increase in k improves this agency cost more the lower
the manager’s information quality. When this e¤ect dominates the e¤ect on
the value of private information, the optimal expense ratio is decreasing in the
signal precision.
5 Direct market participation
So far, it has been assumed that neither the agent nor the principal can trade
on their own accounts as long as they are committed to a delegated portfolio
management contract. However, if either party is allowed to trade on his own
account, an excess exposure to the single risk factor through the managed port-
folio could be o¤set by decreasing the number of shares directly held in the risky
asset and viceversa. The implication regarding the case of the agent participat-
ing directly in the market is that an in…nite number of responses to any given
compensation function are optimal from the agent’s viewpoint. Consequently,
the principal cannot ensure any particular action on the agent’s part through
the linear compensation contract.
Consider now the case when only the principal can trade directly in the mar-
ket in the absence of a privately observed signal. Since she can trade on her own
account, she is able to o¤set the agent’s actions in such a way that any compen-
sation scheme achieves the optimal exposure to the risk factor. If the principal
cares about the cost of incentive provision and is able to o¤set inadequate risk
taking by the agent, she will reduce k to zero. As a consequence, the agent will
respond by taking an unbounded position in the risky asset which will be o¤set
by an equally unbounded position of the principal’s personal account.
Finally, if the agent owns a valuable piece of information about the risky as-
set’s return, the principal cannot anticipate the agent’s actual response, which
depends on the noisy signal, and therefore is unable to o¤set the agent’s de-
parture from appropriate risk taking. Hence, being able to trade directly in
the market does not help the principal in the presence of a privately observed
signal. Of course, the problem could be solved if the signal were observable by
the principal after the contracting stage. In that case, a contract scheme that
penalizes opportunistic behavior on the investor’s part would be feasible.
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6 Conclusions
This paper shows in a very simple model that a pro…t-based fee is arguably
a less e¢cient compensation mechanism in terms of risk sharing consistently
with …ndings by Grinblatt and Titman (1989) or Chevalier and Ellison (1997).
However, even though the incremental cost of an assets-based fee to the investor
can be signi…cantly larger, a pro…t-based fee does not generally induce the agent
to take an unbounded position in the risky asset.
Since assets-based fees appear to be a more popular means of retribution,
the paper studies how the value of these expense ratios should be determined as
a function of some portfolio characteristics such as fund size or the manager’s
forecasting ability. In this context, it is no longer obvious that the resulting
expense ratio must be monotonic in the manager’s forecasting precision. This
perspective can thus be seen as a new look at the negative relationship between
managerial performance and expense ratios found in the mutual fund industry
(see for instance Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997), Metrick and Zeckhauser (1999)
and Christo¤ersen and Musto (1999).)
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Appendix
A1. Proof of Proposition 1.
Let g(W ) denote the manager’s compensation under (15):
g(W ) =
8<
:
g1(W ) = 0 if W  W0
g2(W ) = k(W ¡ W0) if W > W0
The manager’s expected utility can be therefore expressed as the sum of two
integrals:
EVA =
Z 1
¡1
V (g(W ))f (W )dW (47)
=
Z W0
¡1
V (g1(W ))f (W )dW +
Z 1
W0
V (g2(W ))f (W )dW;
where f (W ) denotes the probability density function of W . Alternatively, (47)
can be expressed as:
EVA =
Z W0
¡1
[V (g1(W )) ¡ V (g2(W ))] f (W )dW +
Z 1
¡1
V (g2(W ))f (W )dW
=
Z W0
¡1
[V (g1(W )) ¡ V (g2(W ))] f (W )dW
¡ exp
½
¡aA

k((R ¡ 1)W0 + (s ¡ RP )X) ¡
aAk
2¾2²X
2
2
¸¾
; (48)
where the second equality follows from the fact that W is normally distributed.
Note that the second term in (48) is the agent’s expected utility without limited
liability.
The …rst term in (48) can also be written in terms of the standardized
normally distributed variable z ´ W¡(RW0+(s¡RP )X )¾X :
Z W0
¡1
[V (g1(W )) ¡ V (g2(W ))] f(W )dW
=
Z ¡(R¡1)W0¾X ¡ (s¡RP)¾
¡1
(¡1 + exp(¡ak(¾Xz + (s ¡ RP )X + (R ¡ 1)W0)))Á(z)dz;
where Á(z) denotes the standard normal density. The integral’s derivative with
respect to X equals:
¡
Z ¡ (R¡1)W0¾X ¡ (s¡RP)¾
¡1
ak(z¾ + (s ¡ RP ))
¢ exp(¡ak(¾Xz + (s ¡ RP )X + (R ¡ 1)W0))Á(z)dz:
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Since z¾ + (s ¡ RP ) is negative in the integration interval, the above ex-
pression is positive provided k is positive. It thus follows that imposing limited
liability induces the agent to take a larger position in the risky asset.
In order to prove the second part of proposition 1, note that (48) can alter-
natively be written as:
EVA =
Z 1
¡1
V (g1(W ))f (W )dW +
Z 1
W0
[V (g2(W )) ¡ V (g1(W ))]f (W )dW
=
Z 1
¡1
V (0)f (W )dW +
Z 1
W0
[V (g2(W )) ¡ V (0))] f (W )dW
Since V (0) = ¡1; it follows that:
EVA = ¡1 +
Z 1
W0
[V (g2(W )) + 1)] f(W )dW
= ¡1 +
Z 1
W0
[V (g2(W )) + 1)] f(W )dW:
Consider partitioning the above integral in two parts:
Z 1
W0
[V (g2(W )) + 1)] f (W )dW
=
Z RW0
W0
[V (g2(W )) + 1)] f (W )dW +
Z 1
RW0
[V (g2(W )) + 1)] f (W )dW
= I1 + I2
where:
I1 ´
Z ¡ (s¡RP)
¾
¡ (R¡1)W0
¾X
¡ (s¡RP)
¾
[¡ exp(¡ak(¾Xz + (s ¡ RP )X + (R ¡ 1)W0)) + 1]Á(z)dz;
I2 ´
Z 1
¡ (s¡RP)¾
[¡ exp(¡ak(¾Xz + (s ¡ RP )X + (R ¡ 1)W0)) + 1] Á(z)dz:
At X = 0 the manager’s expected utility equals ¡ exp(¡ak(R ¡ 1)W0). On
the other hand, when X ! 1:
I1(X ! 1) = 0;
I2(X ! 1) = 1 ¡ ©(¡ (s ¡ RP )
¾
):
Therefore, whenever ¡ exp(¡ak(R¡ 1)W0) > ¡©(¡ (s¡RP )¾ ), the manager’s
expected utility at X = 0 is not lower than at X ! 1. If additionally the …rst
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derivative of EVA with respect to X evaluated at X = 0 is positive, then there
must exist X0 with 0 < X0 < 1, such that EVA evaluated at X0 is strictly
larger than EVA evaluated at X ! 1. Taking the …rst derivatives of I1 and
I2 with respect to X; it can be shown that:
@I1
@X
¯¯¯
¯
X=0
= exp(¡ak(R ¡ 1)W0)
Z ¡ (s¡RP)¾
¡1
ak(z¾ + (s ¡ RP ))Á(z)dz
@I2
@X
¯¯¯
¯
X=0
= exp(¡ak(R ¡ 1)W0)
Z 1
¡ (s¡RP)¾
ak(z¾ + (s ¡ RP ))Á(z)dz
Hence,
@EVA
@X
¯¯¯
¯
X=0
=
@I1
@X
¯¯¯
¯
X=0
+
@I2
@X
¯¯¯
¯
X=0
= exp(¡ak(R ¡ 1)W0) ¢ ak(s ¡ RP )
where the second equality follows from the fact that
R 1
¡1 zÁ(z)dz = 0, andR 1
¡1 Á(z)dz = 1. For k > 0, the expected utility at X = 0 increases with an
increase in X .
A2. Properties of C (k):
Function C(k) is de…ned as:
C(k) ´ (1 ¡ k)aP
kaA
¡ 1
2

(1 ¡ k)aP
kaA
¸2
:
The previous function is only de…ned for values of k strictly di¤erent from
zero. The …rst derivative with respect to k is:
C 0(k) =
1 ¡ k(aA
aP
+ 1)
( aAaP )
2k3
;
which takes on a positive value in the interval (0; aPaA+aP ), and a negative value
for values of k in the interval ( aPaA+aP ; 1):
The second derivative with respect to k is given by:
C00(k) =
2k aAaP + 2k ¡ 3³
aA
aP
´2
k4
:
Therefore, C(k) is concave in the interval (0; 3
2
aP
aA+aP
) and convex in ( 3
2
aP
aA+aP
; 1).
A3. Solving the principal’s problem with no private information
Problem (25) can be re-written as the following minimization program:
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min
h
¡(1 ¡ k)RW0 ¡ C (k) (s¡RP )
2
aP¾2²
i
k
sub ject to ¡ k  0
:
The associated Lagrangian is:
L = ¡(1 ¡ k)RW0 ¡ C(k)
(s ¡ RP )2
aP ¾2²
¡ ¸k
The …rst-order condition for k is:
RW0 ¡ C0(k)
(s ¡ RP )2
aP ¾2²
¡ ¸ = 0
With ¸ = 0; k is the solution to:
C 0(k)
(s ¡ RP )2
aP ¾2²
= RW0
A4. Properties of functions - and ª.
Function ª is de…ned as:
ª ´ C (k)
aP
³2
(¾2² + 2C(k)¾
2
s)
:
The partial derivative of ª with respect to k is:
@ª
@k
=
³2
aP
¾2²
(¾2² + 2C¾
2
s)
2
C0:
Therefore, the increasing and decreasing regions of ª coincide with those of
C . The function reaches its maximum value when k = aP
aA+aP
:
The second partial derivative with respect to k equals:
@2ª
(@k)2
=
³2
aP

¾2²
(¾2² + 2C¾
2
s)
2
C00 ¡ 4¾
2
²¾
2
s
(¾2² + 2C¾
2
s)
3
[C0]2
¸
:
Since C is assumed to be nonnegative, the term (¾2² + 2C¾
2
s) is always pos-
itive. Hence, ª is concave with respect to k whenever C00 takes on a negative
value, i.e., when k is lower than 3
2
aP
aP+aA
:
On the other hand function - is de…ned as:
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- ´ 1
2aP
log
µ
¾2² + 2C¾
2
s
¾2²
¶
:
Its …rst derivative with respect to k is:
@-
@k
=
1
aP
¾2s
¾ 2² + 2C¾
2
s
C 0;
hence - is increasing in k for the same values as C .
The second derivative is given by:
@2-
(@k)2
=
1
aP

¾2s
¾2² + 2C¾
2
s
C00 ¡ 2(¾
2
s)
2
(¾2² + 2C¾
2
s)
2
[C0]2
¸
;
therefore, C00 < 0 is a su¢cient condition for - being concave in k:
A5. Solving the principal’s problem with private information
Problem (43) can be rewritten as follows:
min [¡(1 ¡ k)RW0 ¡ ª(k) ¡ -(k)]
k
sub ject to ¡ k  0
:
The associated Lagrangian is:
L = ¡(1 ¡ k)RW0 ¡ ª(k) ¡ -(k) ¡ ¸k
The …rst-order condition for k is:
RW0 ¡
@(ª + -)
@k
¡ ¸ = 0
With ¸ = 0; k is the solution to:
@(ª + -)
@k
= RW0
A6. How the slope of ª + - changes with the precision of private
information
First, de…ne ± as:
± ´ ¾
2
²
¾2r
;
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so it is possible to replace ¾2² with ±¾
2
r and ¾
2
s with (1¡±)¾2r in the expression for
the …rst derivative of ª with respect to k in appendix (A4). Next it is possible
to calculate how the slope of ª with respect to k changes when ± increases,
@(@ª@ k )
@±
=
@2ª
@k@±
=
³2
¾2raP
2C (1 + ±) ¡ ±
(2C(1 ¡ ±) + ±)3 C
0:
From the above expression, and focusing exclusively on the region for which
C 0 > 0; it can be deduced that the slope of ª is increasing in ± when k is such
that:
C >
±
2(1 + ±)
:
As for -:
@(@-
@k
)
@±
=
@2-
@k@±
=
¡C0
aP (2C(1 ¡ ±) + ±)2
:
The slope of - is therefore always decreasing in ±:
Finally the joint e¤ect of changes in ± on the slope of ª + - can be seen
through the following derivative:
@(
@(ª+-)
@k )
@±
=
@2ª
@k@±
+
@2-
@k@±
=
C0
aP (2C(1 ¡ ±) + ±)2

³2
¾2r
2C (1 + ±) ¡ ±
(2C (1 ¡ ±) + ±)3 ¡ 1
¸
;
which is positive for values of k such that:
C >
1
2
±(³2 + ¾2r)
(³2 ¡ ¾2r) + ±(³2 + ¾2r)
:
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Fee
Risky asset's payoff
Figure 1. Plot of the fund manager’s fee, k¢ max(0; W ¡ W0) –where W0 and
W denote the portfolio’s initial and terminal values respectively– as a function
of the risky asset’s payo¤, r, and X , i.e., the number of shares of the risky asset,
for X = 0 (thick line), X = X0 > 0 (solid line); and X = 2X0 (dashed line).
All lines intersect when r equals the payo¤ of the investment in the riskless asset.
For larger values the manager’s compensation is increasing in X , whereas the
converse is true for smaller values of r .
24
01
1k
Figure 2. The …gure shows the fraction of the investor’s optimal certainty
equivalent in excess of the certainty equivalent derived from a zero invest-
ment in the risky asset, that the investor may obtain as a function of the ex-
pense ratio k . The function is one only if k = k¤ = ap
aA+aP
; where aP and aA
denote the principal’s and the agent’s risk aversion coe¢cients. The function
is concave for k < 3
2
k¤:
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